Nawaf Salam, a 71-year-old ambassador, diplomat, and jurist—the head of the ICJ—was appointed as Lebanon’s new prime minister, marking a pivotal moment for a nation grappling with profound political and economic crises.
A reformist figure with an illustrious career in international law and diplomacy, Salam’s ascension follows his unsuccessful bid for the premiership in 2022, when he lost to Najib Mikati, the leader he now replaces. Salam embodies a long-awaited opportunity for Lebanon’s pro-reform movement to amplify their voices and challenge entrenched sectarian politics. His extensive domestic and global experience fuels optimism about his capacity to navigate Lebanon’s complex political landscape.
Salam, a member of a dominant political family in Lebanon as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations from 2007 to 2017, played a pivotal role in advocating for the country’s security and sovereignty, particularly through his support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and his efforts to enforce UN Resolution 1701, which underpins the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. Similarly, his tenure as President of the ICJ from 2024 to 2025 remarked, especially for presiding over landmark cases such as South Africa’s genocide allegations against Israel and the ICJ’s ruling on the illegality of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories.
Salam’s profound understanding of Lebanon’s political dysfunctions, combined with his expertise in international law and diplomacy, equips him to tackle both domestic reforms and regional challenges. However, the obstacles he faces are significant and daunting.
Brake on Hezbollah’s Destructive Role
Salam’s elevation to the premiership at this critical juncture in Lebanon’s history represents a historic opportunity and a set of formidable risks, particularly about Hezbollah’s entrenched influence.
Salam has signalled an intention to pursue an inclusive approach, explicitly stating that his “hand is extended to everyone”—including Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Hezbollah and its allies have responded with marked objection to his nomination, casting doubt on his ability to implement the reforms Lebanon so desperately needs. Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc leader, Mohammad Raad, publicly denounced Salam’s appointment as “sowing division” and questioned the new government’s commitment to Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing framework. Perceptions within Hezbollah further compound this antagonism that Salam’s rise, facilitated by Western and Gulf support, is a threat to this Shiite organisation.
Despite these objections, Hezbollah’s capacity to obstruct Salam’s government appears diminished. The group has suffered significant setbacks in recent months, including the loss of key leaders in its confrontation with Israel, the weakening of its principal backer, Iran, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. These developments have left Hezbollah politically and militarily weakened, with little choice but to acquiesce to the new political reality, at least tacitly. Indeed, Salam’s appointment is widely interpreted as evidence of Hezbollah’s declining dominance, as the group’s sectarian and obstructionist tactics have become increasingly unsustainable in the face of mounting domestic and international pressure for reform.
At the same time, Salam’s designation has been welcomed by Western and Gulf actors—most notably Saudi Arabia—which had previously limited their engagement with Lebanon due to Hezbollah’s outsized role. Their support for President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam has created new incentives for Hezbollah and its allies to at least refrain from outright sabotaging the reform process if they do not actively cooperate.
Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system, which mandates a Sunni Muslim prime minister, Maronite Christian president, and Shi’ite Muslim parliamentary speaker, remains a major obstacle to effective governance and reform. Salam’s lack of support from the Shi’a bloc, led by Hezbollah, presents a significant challenge to forming a stable government. Without broad-based cooperation, Lebanon risks political paralysis or a crisis of legitimacy, potentially leading to institutional deadlock once again.
Therefore, Salam’s ability to engage with the country’s political forces—most crucially the Shi’a groups—and to navigate these entrenched dynamics will be decisive in overcoming Lebanon’s chronic political deadlocks. In this regard, Salam’s explicit commitment to forming a non-partisan government—by excluding overtly partisan ministers and ensuring that no ministry is monopolised or denied to any sect or group—was a significant break from the patronage and sectarian quota cycles that have historically paralysed Lebanese governance.
Notably, within a month of Salam’s appointment, a cabinet that included Shi’a ministers was formed. Despite initial objections, even Hezbollah and Amal ultimately endorsed the government through a broad parliamentary vote of confidence. This shift reflected a pragmatic willingness among Shi’a parties to participate in governance and avoid further paralysis, especially given Lebanon’s dire economic circumstances.
While political overtures are offered to reassure Hezbollah and Amal that exclusion is not intended, the new Lebanese leadership did not hesitate to use the stick. Law enforcement agencies have begun removing Hezbollah flags and imagery from major roads in Beirut, replacing them with messages heralding “A New Era for Lebanon.” The move, reportedly ordered by Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar and backed by newly appointed President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, signals growing momentum to challenge Hezbollah’s armed status.
Amid calls for 2025 to be the year when only the state holds weapons, Lebanese forces have dismantled symbols and, reportedly, infrastructure linked to the group—despite opposition from Hezbollah supporters and lingering political complexities. International pressure, particularly from the U.S., has reinforced this trajectory, with aid now tied to full state control over arms. Still, the path ahead remains fraught, as disarmament efforts must navigate Hezbollah’s deep-rooted presence in Lebanon’s political and social fabric.
A Renewed Bridge to the World
These efforts bolster Beirut’s ties to the international community. In fact, Salam’s designation—endorsed by President Aoun, a political figure known for his constructive ties with Western and Gulf states—signals a potential realignment in Lebanon’s political international alliances. Salam’s international reputation and reformist credentials have raised hopes for a new chapter in Lebanon’s relations with Western and Gulf countries.
For an extended period, Lebanon’s ties with these actors have been severely strained, primarily due to Hezbollah’s close connections with Iran and the Assad regime in Syria, as well as its involvement in regional conflicts. In particular, Gulf states have intensified economic and diplomatic pressure on Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s activities in conflict zones such as Yemen and Syria and its alleged involvement in transnational crimes like drug trafficking. This pressure has exacerbated Lebanon’s fragile economy, deepening economic and political isolation.
Notably, Salam’s appointment as prime minister has been positively received by key Arab and Western states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with indications that financial and diplomatic support for Lebanon may increase.
On the other hand, restoring these strategic and constructive relationships hinges on Salam’s ability to address formidable challenges, foremost among them the need to rein in Hezbollah and reestablish the authority of the weakened Lebanese state. In other words, Salam’s ultimate success will depend on his capacity to navigate the murky waters of Lebanese politics and implement substantive reforms.
Hope for International Justice
Furthermore, the appointment of a figure who holds the title of former judge at the ICJ—the highest judicial organ of international law, often referred to as the “World Court”—as prime minister has generated cautious optimism regarding the enforceability of international law in a region long marked by impunity.
Salam’s assumption of office comes at a time when allegations of systematic violations of international humanitarian law by Israel in Lebanon, Gaza, and other areas are intensifying, including the disproportionate use of force against civilians, attacks on infrastructure protected under international law, and collective punishment policies. Historically, such actions have rarely resulted in serious international consequences, mainly due to the impunity enjoyed by Tel Aviv thanks to Western backing. However, Salam’s prominent institutional background and reputation within the international legal community offer Lebanon a unique opportunity to bring these violations to the forefront of the international legal agenda more effectively.
Under Salam’s leadership, Beirut could not only highlight Israel’s unlawful actions but also advocate for international mechanisms to address violations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Syria. His expertise in international judicial bodies, including the ICJ, could foster stronger ties with Global South countries pursuing justice against Israel and help translate growing European sensitivity into diplomatic actions. Notably, the ICJ’s recent classification of Israel’s actions in Palestine as illegal, along with provisional measures in the South Africa genocide case, signals progress for those seeking greater accountability.
While the inherently slow and uncertain nature of international legal processes means that concrete results may take time to materialise, Salam’s leadership nonetheless opens a new chapter for Lebanon—and, more broadly, for the region’s pursuit of justice by sending a strong message that international law can serve not only as a rhetorical device but also as a foundational element of foreign policy, enhancing both the technical capacity and legitimacy of Lebanon’s claims on the international stage.