A December revolution in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has shaken the region’s geopolitical balance and produced winners and losers. Iran and Russia, long-time backers of the Assad regime, faced a reputational blow, particularly Tehran, which has lost a crucial partner for supplying Hezbollah and projecting influence in the Levant.
In contrast, Türkiye finds itself in a stronger position. Ankara has forged robust ties with leading figures in the newly formed Syrian transitional government, most notably Ahmed al-Sharaa, signalling the start of a new era after more than a decade of cold relations. This détente has already borne fruit: Türkiye has secured a defence pact with the Damascus-based authority and agreed to establish a military base near the Tiyas airbase, T4.
But not everyone is pleased. Israel, wary of the opposition’s rise and Türkiye’s increasing weight, has viewed the shift with suspicion from day one. Prime Minister Netanyahu and key members of his cabinet now regard a direct military clash with Türkiye in Syria as a growing possibility. While Israel leans on unilateral justifications to recalibrate the regional chessboard, Türkiye remains steadfast in its support for an independent and unified Syria.
So, is a Türkiye-Israel confrontation in Syria no longer just a hypothetical, but a looming risk?
What’s unfolding in Syria isn’t just a reshaping of the country’s internal dynamics—it’s laying bare a deeper clash of visions between Türkiye and Israel. The two countries couldn’t be further apart in how they imagine Syria’s future. While Israel advocates for a fragmented, federal structure that elevates minority groups such as the Kurds and Druze, Türkiye supports a unified Syrian state with a strong central government—one that could pursue an inclusive agenda for all its citizens.
Türkiye’s backing of a unified Syria goes beyond diplomatic formalities—it represents a clear strategic imperative. As the transitional government adopts a more inclusive approach toward minorities, Israel has largely dismissed these overtures, instead casting itself as the de facto guardian of groups like the Kurds and Druze. Against this backdrop, the recent reconciliation moves between the YPG-dominated SDF and the Syrian regime marks a significant turning point. Though seemingly reluctant, the move was a strategic necessity for the SDF in light of the American withdrawal from Syria. Even more consequential is the PKK’s apparent alignment with Öcalan’s call to disarm—potentially signalling the beginning of the end for a conflict that has long burdened Türkiye.
With stability gaining ground and its security landscape improving, Türkiye aims to train the country’s restructured army, signalling a proactive stance against any resurgence of Daesh or similar threats. But for Israel, a dynamic and assertive Türkiye next door is an unwelcome development. That may explain why Israeli airstrikes—ostensibly aimed at leftover regime munitions—recently targeted roads and infrastructure near the T4 airbase, where Türkiye plans to establish a military presence. The message is clear: Israel doesn’t want Türkiye as a neighbour in post-war Syria.
Still, it’s worth noting that Türkiye, too, has no interest in seeing a destabilising Israel expand its military footprint in the region. The agreement to establish a military base near the T4 airfield wasn’t an act of coercion, but rather the product of mutual consent between Ankara and the new Syrian administration. There’s no dictating here—only diplomatic alignment.
For Israel, however, the familiar refrain of “security threat” remains a convenient shield for expansionism. From its long-standing occupation of the Golan Heights to its persistent strikes beyond the border, Israel has used the language of threat perception to justify a status quo that increasingly resembles strategic overreach.
The United States, for its part, appears wary of escalation. Long before taking office, Donald Trump had warned against entangling America in another Middle Eastern conflict. That caution was on full display during a visibly tense meeting with Netanyahu at the White House. The post-meeting optics said it all: a sombre Israeli premier, frustrated by Washington’s reluctance to greenlight yet another front.
The recent talks between Turkish and Israeli officials in Azerbaijan mark a crucial diplomatic move—one designed to avert a direct clash in Syria. At the heart of any possible breakthrough lies a simple principle: mutual recognition of the new Syrian administration’s legitimacy and sanctions relief. Without that baseline, the rest is noise.
For Ankara, the path forward is clear. It has already extended diplomatic recognition, built institutional ties, and established a security partnership rooted in regional stabilisation. Türkiye doesn’t need to do more—it has already done the heavy lifting. Washington seems to agree. U.S. officials have openly acknowledged that any serious roadmap on Syria runs through Ankara.
Discomfort persists in Washington—particularly among Trump-era policymakers—over the inclusion of individuals they brand as ‘former jihadists’ in Syria’s transitional government. But such labels ring hollow coming from a political establishment that has long backed terrorists and violent actors, ranging from anti-Castro operatives and Nicaragua’s Contras to Colombia’s Los Pepes and Syria’s YPG. Rhetoric cannot mask the hypocrisy of selectively invoking moral standards when it suits geopolitical interests.
In any case, what matters now is not who these individuals were, but what the new administration intends to become. With a clean break from the Assad regime and a pledge to build mechanisms grounded in international law and transitional justice, the new leadership deserves to be judged on its present actions, not its past affiliations.
For now, open diplomatic channels offer a reassuring signal: a direct military confrontation between Türkiye and Israel isn’t on the immediate horizon. But whether that restraint holds depends less on Ankara and more on Tel Aviv. If any actor is likely to shift the situation toward escalation, it is Israel, with its history of expansionist policies and occupation-driven provocations.
Türkiye, meanwhile, is charting a different course—one aimed at stability, counterterrorism, and regional reintegration. But its red lines are clear. If instability in Syria begins to surge once again, particularly from actors that undermine Türkiye’s security architecture, Ankara will not remain passive.
Its planned military presence at the T4 airbase is not a provocation, but a precaution. Air defence systems, personnel deployments, and strategic infrastructure at the base are all part of Türkiye’s broader commitment to ensuring that the promise of Syria’s transitional phase is not derailed by internal unrest or external interventions before it even takes root.