On Sunday, March 31, more than 60 million Turkish voters went to the polls to elect local officials. The election results revealed outcomes that transcended local dynamics. These results will have various implications for Türkiye in the upcoming period.
TRT World Research Centre experts shed light on the surprises of the March 31, 2024 elections, the rationale behind these results, the lessons to be learned, and what they mean for Türkiye.
Click to jump to an expert reaction:
Dr Tarek Cherkaoui: Is Türkiye’s Political Landscape Transforming?
Ömer Carullah Sevim: What were the surprises of the 2024 local elections?
Murat Selvi: Local services were not the priority in these local elections
Burak Elmalı: What is the main message coming out of the polls?
Cagdas Yuksel: What are the tasks facing the ruling alliance led by the AK Party?
Huseyin Ozdemir: The dynamics leading to CHP’s victory in the local elections?
Ömer Carullah Sevim: How did smaller parties fare in the 2024 local elections?
Ferhat Polat: What is the main agenda for Türkiye in the upcoming period?
Dr Tarek Cherkaoui: Is Türkiye’s Political Landscape Transforming?
The 2024 local elections in Türkiye heralded a considerable shift in the political landscape, marking a departure from two decades of utter dominance by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). For the first time in 22 years, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) clinched the top spot, a feat not achieved since 1977. The AK Party lost control of 11 cities it had held since the 2019 elections and produced a subpar performance in Türkiye’s five largest cities.
This outcome underscores a critical juncture in Turkish politics, shaped by an economic slowdown and a strategic pivot from the CHP towards more inclusive policies that resonated with conservative voters beyond its traditional strongholds. The polls reflected voter dissatisfaction with the economic situation, particularly the high inflation rate, and its policy towards Gaza. Many of the AK Party’s traditional supporters either abstained from voting or shifted their allegiance to right-wing parties not vilified by the government, contributing to a significantly lower turnout of 78.5 percent – the lowest since the 2004 elections. It was speculated that many pensioners, a significant voter base for the AK Party, did not vote, expressing discontent with their diminishing purchasing power amid soaring inflation.
Moreover, the AK Party’s strategy to run a less divisive and more candidate-focused campaign backfired, failing to demotivate opposition-leaning citizens and inadvertently not capitalising on President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s broader popularity. Additionally, the dark horse of these elections, namely the New Welfare Party (YRP), emerged as a force that appeals to the religious and conservative voter base, further fragmenting the AK Party’s support. The YRP’s wanted a more assertive stance from the government towards Israel, and raised domestic issues that resonate with voters, leading to a notable performance in these polls.
This election cycle also underscored the nuanced role local elections play in Turkish democracy, serving as both a referendum on national policies and a barometer for future political directions. The AK Party now faces the imperative task of interpreting the electorate’s message, focusing on economic recovery and policy recalibration.
Conversely, the CHP’s challenge is to maintain its current electoral success while achieving a delicate equilibrium between keeping alliance unity intact and broadening its reach across Türkiye’s varied political landscape. This task is daunting, particularly in light of historical precedents. For instance, the CHP’s failure to leverage its 1989 victory under similar circumstances—facing a longstanding right-wing national government and achieving an unexpected win—serves as a cautionary tale. Despite the local triumphs back then, the CHP was unable to secure a national victory, and most of its gains were lost in the subsequent local elections five years later. So, nothing is guaranteed for the future.
Moreover, the disintegration of the Nation Alliance post-May 2023 and the subsequent electoral decline of its constituent parties except for the CHP hint at a broader reconfiguration of Türkiye’s opposition bloc. This development, coupled with the performance of the YRP ushers in the unexpected rise of this party as a serious contender for conservative votes, introducing fresh dynamics into Türkiye’s political arena.
The outcomes of the 2024 local elections thus signal a pivotal moment for Turkish politics. They not only reflect the electorate’s current sentiments, particularly on economic issues, but also set the stage for a reinvigorated political discourse that could reshape the contours of power and influence in Türkiye’s path towards the 2028 general elections.
Ömer Carullah Sevim: What were the surprises of the 2024 local elections?
Undoubtedly the biggest surprise of the election was that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) became the second party for the first time in its 22 years in power, while the Republican People’s Party (CHP) emerged as the first party for the first time in half a century. This situation can be interpreted in two ways. First, the monetary policy, which has been tight for a while, seems to have been reflected in the ballot box. Secondly, it should be noted that the CHP’s efforts to go beyond their coastal vote, where it had been stuck for some time, towards regions with more conservative voters affected results. In other words, these election results should be seen as the fruits of a shift away from a political discourse centred on strict secularism.
In addition, local elections are also a way for voters to convey their message to Ankara without changing the administration. The test for the AK Party in the coming years will be to get this message right, while the CHP’s biggest effort will be to make its success in this election permanent. It is worth remembering that the CHP also achieved relative success in the 2019 local elections, but this success was not reflected in the general elections that followed.
Another surprise of this election is that although the Nation Alliance disintegrated after the May 2023 elections, the CHP’s voter consolidation has expanded to include the voter bases of its former allies. The CHP’s partners, the Good Party (IYI Parti), Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA Party), Future (Gelecek) Party, Democrat (Demokrat) Party and Felicity (Saadet) Party, saw their votes collapse in these elections. In this context, the Nation Alliance’s reconsolidation under the umbrella of CHP should be noted as one of the important unexpected results of the election.
On the other hand, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the partner of the AK Party in the People’s Alliance, won in 8 provinces and more than a hundred districts, while the New Welfare Party (YRP), which entered the 2023 elections with the People’s Alliance but parted ways before these local elections, exceeded its expected rise and became the third party in Türkiye. In this context, for the first time, a new party has emerged as a strong rival to the AK Party in terms of winning the votes of conservative voters.
The above-mentioned surprises will have an impact on the general atmosphere of Turkish politics.
In this regard, in the run-up to the 2028 general elections, the results of these local elections will have a significant impact on the new alliance efforts and the existing alliance balances. At the same time, CHP and the YRP will have the chance to provide direct services to voters for the first time in many cities. To date, the service record of CHP municipalities has not been very good. Whether the results of these elections will have a lasting impact on Turkish politics will depend also on the local success of these parties.
Murat Selvi: Local services were not the priority in these local elections
Justice and Development Party (AK Party) municipalism, which has become a brand accepted even by opposition voters, could not save the AK Party from falling into the second-party position for the first time in its history in the last local election.
On the other hand, despite failures in local services, unfulfilled promises, allegations of corruption, and turmoil within the party, expressed even by its voters, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) reached its highest vote rate in almost fifty years.
The two most important cities of the country, Istanbul, and Ankara, which were under the rule of the AK Party for many years, had passed to the CHP in the 2019 elections. The AK Party, which has been dreaming of winning these cities again for the last five years, could not achieve this, and the CHP won many provinces and districts where the AK Party was previously strong.
The first and most obvious message of the local election, which resulted in the AK Party’s loss of power, a surprise even for the CHP, is undoubtedly that local elections are still profoundly linked to ideology, polarisation, and the general political atmosphere. Even in Hatay, where the CHP candidate was most criticised by his voters, the AK Party was able to win the election by a very narrow margin.
With exceptions, although parties have tended to focus on the candidate’s capacity, competence, and past achievements in candidate selection processes, the candidate is still not at the top of the factors affecting voters’ voting behaviour in local elections.
Moreover, as a natural consequence of this approach, issues such as urbanisation, transportation, traffic management, landscaping and cleaning, garbage collection, and water and sewage management, which are the primary duties of local governments, seem to be far behind ideology and partisanship in terms of impact on votes.
The participation rate in elections in Türkiye is generally quite high. However, it can be said that voters who did not go to the polls affected the election as much as those who voted in elections where the voter turnout was around seventy percent, such as the AK Party’s first general and local elections.
In this election, it is a common belief that the approximately ten percent of voters who did not go to the polls were primarily retirees who thought they were economically discriminated against. Older adults went to the polls in last year’s elections, when economic conditions were even more challenging, and supported Erdogan. However, the idea that they were not as protected against inflation as civil servants and minimum wage earners may have prevented them from voting this time. However, it is a mystery how Generation Z voters, the youngest voters whose numbers exceed seven million, behaved in this local election.
We are faced with a result that is so interesting and full of surprises that each city is worth analysing separately. However, the fact that the CHP won the election by increasing its votes in important cities such as Antalya, Izmir, and Adana, especially in Istanbul and Ankara, will be interpreted by the opposition as a general election rehearsal, and the general political atmosphere will be under the influence of this election until the next one. Even though the AK Party became the party that won the most districts and counties in total.
Burak Elmalı: What is the main message coming out of the polls?
The 2024 local elections in Türkiye were pivotal in determining the composition of municipal councils alongside the election of city and district mayors. Municipal councils are crucial legislative bodies responsible for decision-making on various local issues, including budgets, infrastructure services, zoning and environmental plans, and borrowing. They play a pivotal role in representing constituents, ensuring oversight and accountability, and contributing to policy-making at the grassroots level.
The composition of municipal councils reflects the general sentiment and political affiliations of voters in specific regions. While voters may align with a particular party for mayoral candidates, their choices for municipal council members can vary, leading to diverse party representations within councils. A 10% threshold in municipal council elections underscores the importance of strategic voting and party dynamics in local politics.
Examining the results of municipal council elections in major metropolitan areas provides insights into party performance and voter behaviour. In Istanbul, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) secured 45% of the votes, gaining a majority in the municipal council for the first time. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) received 38% of the votes, followed by smaller parties with minor shares. In Ankara’s municipal council, the situation is as follows: CHP won the majority with 49%, followed by AK Party with 28%, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with 4%, and New Welfare Party (YRP) with 4%. Compared to the 2019 local elections, CHP secured the majority in the provincial council in Ankara. In Izmir, CHP maintained the majority in the provincial council with 48%, while AK Party came second with 31%, followed by Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) and Good Party (IYI Party) with 4% each. In Bursa, CHP became the leading party in the provincial council with 38%, followed by AK Party with 35%. YRP received 6%, and the Good Party and Victory (Zafer) Party received each 4%. In Şanlıurfa, while the mayoralty was won by a YRP candidate, the AK Party ranked first with 33% in the municipal council, followed by YRP with 30%. This situation can be observed in other cities and exemplifies that the parties of mayors and the leading parties in municipal councils may not necessarily be the same.
An analysis of the 2024 local election outcomes reveals notable disparities between the party affiliations evident in municipal council elections and those observed in mayoral elections. These discrepancies arise from a multitude of factors influencing voter behaviour. It is noteworthy that voters may adopt differing stances when casting their votes for mayoral candidates compared to their decisions regarding municipal council members. Moreover, local-level dynamics, including geographical proximity, personal familiarity, and familial ties, significantly impact Türkiye’s electoral landscape. While some voters may have opted for a sanction vote in mayoral elections, their choices in municipal council elections reflect a more nuanced evaluation of candidates and political parties.
Finally, of particular interest is the rise of the CHP as the prevailing party on both ballots, compared to the previous elections in 2019. It is evident, as President Erdogan stated in his speech, the economic situation also played a significant role in the decision of the voters. At this stage, this new voting behaviour observed among voters in both mayoral and municipal council elections calls for a thorough evaluation process that requires coordination among the AK Party’s district, provincial, and central organisations of decision-making.
Cagdas Yuksel: What are the tasks facing the ruling alliance led by the AK Party?
While choosing local administrators who will serve for 5 years, voters’ decisions also carry significant messages for the government and the People’s Alliance. For the first time, the AK Party trailed behind the CHP in the election race.
While the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) won 12 metropolitan municipalities and 12 provinces, it lost 18 out of the 39 municipalities it won in 2019. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), on the other hand, won in 8 provinces. Of the 11 provinces won by the MHP in 2019, 5 went to the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and 2 to the AK Party. Losing the only metropolitan municipality it held, Manisa, the MHP won the municipal presidency in Tokat for the first time in its history. However, the AK Party also won the elections in Hatay, Kahramanmaras and Malatya, which suffered greatly from earthquakes. From the People’s Alliance, the Great Unity Party (BBP) took Sivas from its alliance partner, the AK Party.
In the People’s Alliance, the AK Party’s vote share decreased by approximately 9% points compared to five years ago, remaining around 35.48%. The MHP, on the other hand, faced a loss of nearly 2.3% points from its 2019 vote share of 7.31%.
The turnout rate was 78.11%, which stands out as the lowest rate in the last 20 years. Considering the New Welfare Party’s (YRP) vote share of 6.19%, it can be inferred that some AK Party voters who wanted to send a message to the government did not go to the polls.
In the May 2023 elections, the YRP, which supported the People’s Alliance, emerged as a significant opposition figure in the local elections. Shaping its election campaign with criticisms on retired salaries, interest rate decisions, the economy, and relations with Israel, the YRP won the mayoralty of Şanlıurfa and Yozgat, receiving a total of 6.19% of the vote nationwide. In this context, it will be important for the government to evaluate the direction of the voters in this regard.
AK Party’s fundamental success in the elections it has won so far has been attributed to economic development, infrastructure improvement, industrial and technological advancements, and foreign policy achievements. In this context, it can be inferred from the March 31 elections that the Turkish people have entrusted important tasks to the government and issued a warning.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his address to the voters following the election results, stated that they had received the message from the voters, emphasising that the March 31 elections were not an end for them but actually a turning point, and that the Turkish nation once again conveyed their messages to politicians through the ballot box.
President Erdogan’s speech is important in highlighting the issues that the AK Party will take on in the coming period. In this context, he underlined the reconstruction of the earthquake-stricken region, economic difficulties, the fight against inflation, the continuation of the fight against terrorist organisations, and the strengthening of Türkiye’s international role and key position.
However, the most important gain of this election for the government is the formation of a unity between the government and the opposition, with every segment of society becoming a partner to the government through local administrations. In this sense, competition between the government and the opposition will not only nourish the government but also allow every citizen to have a say in shaping the country’s future, contributing to a more inclusive and democratic society, thus strengthening Turkish democracy.
Huseyin Ozdemir: The dynamics leading to CHP’s victory in the local elections?
After the opposition’s defeat in the 2023 elections, a new election result emerged on the evening of March 31 that no one could have predicted. With the “change movement” they initiated, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and essentially the “changeists” achieved a victory in the municipal elections that social democrats had not achieved in the last 50 years. They achieved this not with a party alliance in the elections but with a non-partisan social consensus, sometimes defined as the Istanbul alliance or the Türkiye alliance.
In the picture that emerged after the local elections of March 31, 2019, the Nation Alliance, consisting of the CHP and the Good Party (IYI Party), had come to power in 5 of the 6 most populated cities in the country. They had also come to a position of controlling a stronger opposition wave compared to previous years. In late 2019, two spin-off parties were born: Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA Party) and the Future (Gelecek) Party, which broke away from the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Within a few years, the Nation Alliance, in which the CHP and Good Party were the driving forces, evolved into a six-party structure, including the Democrat (Demokrat) Party and the Felicity (Saadet) Party, in addition to these two parties. However, the 2023 general elections revealed that the ‘Table of 6’ was dysfunctional, and entering the elections with a multi-structured alliance was a painful price that brought more harm than good.
The fact that DEVA, the Future Party, the Felicity Party, and the Democrat Party, which entered the parliamentary elections on the CHP list, won many times more parliamentary seats than their votes, and that the then CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu imposed his own candidacy in an election where the opposition was very close to winning, caused deep disappointment and anger on the opposition front. With Ekrem İmamoğlu, the new czar of the opposition, spearheading a movement for change, Kılıçdaroğlu was narrowly defeated in an internal party election, and the change movement’s candidate Özgür Özel became the new party leader. Less than a year before the elections, this change has often been criticised as weakening. However, the current picture shows that the CHP is the party that reads the election process the best and that it does so with the power of change and rejuvenation.
The Good Party’s attempt to become the main opposition party alternative to the CHP by entering the elections ‘free and independent’ turned into a disappointment. By entering the elections free and independent, the CHP had the opportunity to show that it was not beholden to alliances and other parties and had the opportunity to show itself in local governance and gain more support from the public in the period until the presidential elections in 2028.
With the CHP entering the elections without an alliance, Özgür Özel, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and Mansur Yavaş, the architects of the election victory, have cemented their positions as strong figures of the opposition.
CHP must translate its success in the municipalities into a major transformation of power in four years by maintaining a careful, inclusive, unifying, and reassuring language in the executive branch. The right or wrong steps that İmamoğlu, who has lit the fire of “change” in CHP, will take in the next four years will be the measure of whether he will reach the presidency or not. With the municipalities, it won and its vote share across Türkiye, CHP has cemented its place as the locomotive force of the opposition until the next elections. But the other parties of the “table of 6” suffered a major defeat. The Victory (Zafer) Party and the Turkish Labour Party (TIP) failed to make a strong presence. The New Welfare Party (YRP) made significant gains as the right-wing opposition party, but we will see in the coming period to what extent this success will accelerate.
In summary, the election-weary electorate in 2023 conveyed a message to the government to address the economic and political challenges in the upcoming period and to the opposition in the 2024 local elections that Turkish society appreciated change and rejuvenation. Of course, the government and the opposition should read the message of the citizens well and study their lessons well in line with these messages to aspire for the votes of the people until the next elections.
Ömer Carullah Sevim: How did smaller parties fare in the 2024 local elections?
Regarding the success of small parties, it was observed that small-scale parties that were included in the People’s Alliance in the 2023 elections showed their particular importance in these local elections. The New Welfare Party (YRP) is the most remarkable in this context. With two city mayorships and 39 districts, they achieved one of the most prominent successes of the election. However, the party’s place in the People’s Alliance will become more controversial after this election. After their decision to run independently in the local elections, they had already grown tense with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party).
The Free Cause Party (Hüda-Par), another partner of the People’s Alliance, made relative progress in provinces where Kurdish voters are concentrated. However, it did not achieve great success. Hüda-Par will continue to assert itself, but it is too early to say whether it will be an alternative to thePeoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (Dem Party). However, with these elections and the fact that Hüda-Par is fielding candidates in every region of Türkiye, it is possible to say that Türkiye now has two parties based specifically on Kurdish voters.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the other small-scale party of the People’s Alliance, has once again demonstrated its weight within the alliance and in Turkish politics with its success especially in the races against its alliance partner AK Party, in some provinces.
On the other hand, the former partners of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)-led Nation Alliance were literally wiped off the map in these elections. Except for the Good Party’s (IYI Party) victory in Nevşehir, which was the result of the party’s transfer of the former AK Party mayor as its candidate, the five partners of the Nation alliance, excluding the CHP, did not win any province. The total vote share of the other 4 parties, except the Good Party, remained around 1.5%. The DEVA and Future (Gelecek) parties, which broke away from the AK Party, suffered a major defeat in the elections they entered under their own names for the first time. These parties, which made a lot of noise when they were founded, will have very limited influence on the future of Turkish politics. The Felicity (Saadet) Party, the continuation of Necmettin Erbakan’s National Vision tradition, has fallen far behind the party of Fatih Erbakan, the son of Necmettin Erbakan, who broke away from the Felicity Party. It can now be said that the representative of the national vision is the New Welfare Party.
The Good Party, on the other hand, suffered its biggest electoral defeat. Although they entered the elections with a strong candidate in Istanbul, they remained at 0.6%. In Türkiye as a whole, its vote share dropped from around 10% to 3.7%. Discussions have already started within the party. It remains to be seen whether the Good Party can handle this turbulence.
The Victory (Zafer) Party, known for its anti-immigrant stance, polled below the previous elections and below expectations. However, the defeat of this party is lower than other examples. Nevertheless, the power of populist racist rhetoric to shape the public debate in Türkiye is likely to decline.
Ferhat Polat: What is the main agenda for Türkiye in the upcoming period?
In the aftermath of Türkiye’s local elections, the political landscape is set for significant transformation. Victorious parties are now tasked with fulfilling campaign promises, while the defeated must strategize anew to regain popularity. The government will likely focus on economic policies to combat inflation even more intensely. Following the election, the ruling party’s spokesperson emphasised that their primary focus will be economic policies and drafting a new constitution.
Urban regeneration, especially earthquake risk mitigation, demands concerted efforts between local and national administrations, an urgency underscored by the devastating 2023 earthquake. Collaborative rebuilding efforts, such as housing projects for earthquake victims, exemplify the immediate actions required for effective disaster preparedness and community resilience. Thus, it is vital for municipalities, regardless of their political affiliation, to join forces with the central government in providing the essential support and resources for reconstruction projects.
Elections are usually a big burden for any country. With elections behind, the focus shifts from campaign expenditures to substantive investments in public welfare and systemic improvements.
Meanwhile, during the upcoming 4-year period without elections, Turkish politics will probably witness some drastic political realignments with smaller parties petering out while others gaining prominence.
On a broader scale, economic development, infrastructure enhancements, and high-tech industry advancements, particularly in defence, are on the government’s agenda. New policies and initiatives will be launched to stimulate more growth and attract foreign investment. Türkiye has great potential, as it is industrialised and has a varied manufacturing sector. In 2023, its gross domestic product exceeded $1.1 trillion, positioning Türkiye as the 17th highest in the world. Türkiye has stood out over the past few years in high-tech product manufacturing including machinery, medicine, defence as well as transportation. Türkiye’s exports of medium-high and high-tech manufacturing industry products reached $97.2 billion last year. This growth can be attributed to Türkiye’s focus on innovation and investment in research and development.
When considering the defence industry, Türkiye has made remarkable progress in its defence industry by decreasing its reliance on foreign countries from 80% to 20%. The turnover has also seen a significant increase, rising from $1 billion in 2002 to $11 billion in 2020. This increase in domestic production has led to job creation and technological advancements, positioning Türkiye as a key player in the global defence market. We can expect to see even greater advancements and innovations in the Turkish defence industry in the years to come.
Initiatives to boost railway infrastructure, especially in the eastern regions, aim to enhance connectivity and spur economic growth. Türkiye’s ambition as a high-tech manufacturing hub is also supported by its focus on enhanced interconnectedness.
Diplomatically, Türkiye is poised to strengthen its role in international peace efforts and regional security, with a focus on partnerships that foster stability and economic cooperation, particularly with neighbouring countries and across Africa. This long-term diplomatic engagement, unencumbered by immediate electoral pressures, offers Türkiye an opportunity to solidify its standing on the global stage and contribute to broader peace and prosperity.