The Trump sequel is anything but a rerun. From eye-popping territorial claims on Canada and Greenland to tariff wars with the world and ceasefire proposals that redraw Ukraine’s borders, Trump 2.0 is deepening the cracks in the liberal edifice of foreign policy and international order. Perhaps the most defining twist in this new act happened when Washington finally faced the reality of sharing the global stage with another heavyweight, which is China. The honeymoon with Beijing is long over. U.S. foreign policy has shifted into full-scale competition, squeezing out any space for cooperation. And as Trump vows to “un-unite” the so-called limitless friendship between China and Russia, a key question now is whether Trump can succeed in dividing Xi and Putin.
In an era where multipolarity is no longer just a rhetorical concept but a geopolitical reality, the idea of pulling Russia away from China and repositioning it within the U.S. orbit may seem like a rational option through the lens of realist thinking — as pundits like Mearsheimer suggest. However, translating that logic into practice is far more difficult. For the United States, China represents a far greater threat than Russia — as evidenced by sweeping tariff wars involving triple-digit percentages. Yet even though China’s economic hold over Russia increasingly resembles dependency rather than partnership — with China now accounting for up to 40% of Russian imports — building a Washington-Moscow axis remains an uphill battle. There are three core reasons for this.
Anti-hegemony
Drawing direct parallels between today’s geopolitical dynamics and the Sino-Soviet split of the Cold War era is anachronistic. At that time, communist ideology demanded a singular leadership, and following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Mao accused Khrushchev of betrayal—exposing a deep ideological divide. In contrast, what currently binds Russia and China is not ideological unity, but a shared anti-hegemonic outlook. This stance does not constitute a cohesive ideology; rather, it reflects a broader rejection of unipolarity and a desire for a multipolar world where power is more evenly distributed. Some reductionist interpretations mistakenly conflate this anti-hegemonic orientation with anti-American sentiment, often adding less relevant factors such as authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, or illiberal governance—oversimplifying a far more complex geopolitical alignment.
When it comes to foreign policy, regime type or a leader’s political preferences are largely irrelevant in the face of the prevailing logic of power politics. What is at stake is not necessarily achieving dominance in the strictest sense but challenging the very idea that any one dominant power — namely the United States — can claim uncontested superiority. The rigid ideological atmosphere that defined the bipolar Cold War era world no longer applies. What we now face is an economic superpower paired with a nuclear-armed permanent member of the UN Security Council. As Michael McFaul and Evan S. Medeiros have argued in their Foreign Affairs article, pursuing a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy is a delusion from an ideological point of view.
Economic ties matter
Secondly, power politics relies on a long-term risk calculation that goes beyond a 4-year term of a U.S. president and 2-year congressional majority. Should a new U.S. administration assume office in 2028, the prospects for a diplomatic thaw with Russia will grow uncertain—especially if that administration is Democratic, in which case rapprochement appears even less likely.
Currently, China is Russia’s economic lifeline—and Moscow is reaping the rewards. With Beijing snapping up Russian gas and oil and the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline poised to deepen this energy embrace, the economic partnership shows no sign of abetting. Sanctions have taken a serious toll on Russia’s economy, but China’s steady hand has kept it from tipping over. The idea that the United States could step in and economically displace China is wishful thinking. There’s no appetite in Washington—for business or political risk—to fill that void.
Still, from a realist perspective, it is clear the Kremlin is not eager to become Beijing’s junior partner. Moscow has no intention of turning into China’s economic satellite. That’s why it’s carefully pushing for more balanced trade—seeking reciprocity, not dependency. Even if a Trump-led thaw in U.S.-Russia ties delivers a ceasefire in Ukraine, such a development is not expected to pull Moscow away from Beijing. Putin knows better than to bet the house on a potential one-term president when Xi Jinping looks set to rule for a longer period than Trump.
Unilateralism has its limits
Bringing Russia into the U.S. orbit is not a strategy that can succeed through unilateralism alone. While Trump’s go-it-alone approach may resonate with his base, it is unlikely to find favour among America’s allies, who remain wary of any overtures toward the Kremlin. NATO’s European members, along with key Asian partners like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, would likely balk at any sudden realignment that sidelines their security concerns. Any effective strategy to contain China would hinge far more on preserving the trust of these allies—and using that collective pressure—than on cutting deals with Putin. Even if Europe were tempted to rethink its Russia policy, the post-2014 collapse in economic ties with Moscow is not something that can easily be reversed. And pushing America’s European and Asian partners to decouple from China—just to accommodate a hypothetical Moscow pivot—borders on fantasy.
Simply put, if Trump wants to craft a serious strategy on China, he needs to stop looking at the world through Cold War lenses. Yes, pulling Russia into an anti-China alignment might sound appealing at first glance, but history is not so easily repeated. The original Sino-Soviet split was not a fluke. It was born of ideological rivalry, a race for communist leadership, and border disputes. None of that context exists today. What we have now is a far more resilient bond: a shared anti-unipolar outlook that glues Moscow and Beijing together. Trump is not facing the old USSR and Mao’s China. He is up against two permanent members of the UNSC who see value—albeit different kinds—in their strategic partnership. Trump’s gung-ho approach to foreign policy, even if it lasts through 2028, simply does not give Moscow enough incentive to pivot West. A limited rapprochement? Maybe. But remaking a Cold War-style rupture is an illusion.