Most U.S. presidents—especially those who serve two terms—want to leave a mark on history. Each brings their style to the job. Then there’s Donald Trump: the self-proclaimed ‘dealmaker,’ a transactional disruptor who thrives on defying the foreign policy establishment. His playbook? A mix of madman theory and unceremonious bold statements; a brand of diplomacy (or lack thereof) that fits neatly into his ‘America First’ and MAGA mantra.
Now in his second term, Trump confronts a Middle East in disarray—a region destabilised in part by the contradictory policies of successive U.S. administrations that have acted as both arsonist and firefighter. At the heart of the challenge lies a familiar objective: preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The question isn’t just whether Trump can cut a deal with Tehran—it is whether his approach will be a repeat of the 2015 JCPOA or something entirely different. And given his record of denouncing past policies, including those made by fellow Republicans, can he deliver this time? The answer will not only significantly affect the Middle Eastern security architecture but also be a litmus test for the American deterrence questioned during the Biden administration.
Donald Trump’s push for direct nuclear talks with Iran has taken a dramatic turn. A recent letter—delivered to Iran’sSupreme Leader Khamenei through an Emirati diplomat and later handed to Foreign Minister Araghchi—set an ultimatum: negotiate within two months or face consequences. The message was classic Trump: blunt, transactional, and laced with menace. Inside Iran’s political elite, reactions are split. Some resist engagement, while others—feeling the crushing weight of economic sanctions, growing energy crisis, losing strategic footholds in Syria after the removal of the Assad regime, and watching Hezbollah and its proxies suffer heavy blows from Israel—see a deal not as a choice, but a necessity. Yet any nuclear agreement under Trump won’t be a repeat of Obama’s JCPOA. This will be a test of Trump’s maximum pressure doctrine and an aggressive reassertion of American deterrence.
A Different Deal
A Trump-style nuclear deal with Iran would differ radically from the 2015 JCPOA—and these four red lines reveal why. First, the U.S. will impose stricter nuclear constraints: no more 3.67% enrichment ceilings (as under Obama), but a push for near-total disarmament, mirroring Libya’s 2003 surrender of its program. Gone, too, would be the JCPOA’ssunset clauses that let Iran revive its centrifuges after 10–15 years; Trump would insist on permanent bans. Even the 300 kg limit on low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpiles could shrink to near zero. In short, Washington isn’t just aiming to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions—it wants to erase them. And Tehran will almost certainly reject such terms. But these maximalist demands may just be Trump’s opening gambit, designed to force Iran’s hand through sheer brinkmanship.
A second key difference between a potential Trump-era nuclear deal and the JCPOA would be its expanded scope to include restrictions on Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles and demands for dismantling its proxy networks, reflecting Trump’s broader goal of establishing a Middle East security framework. However, Tehran would likely resist missile limitations, offering to restrict nuclear-capable missiles while maintaining conventional ballistic capabilities. Regarding proxies, Iran might benefit from scaling back support for groups like Hezbollah, given their growing financial strainsand logistical challenges, even if it would never openly acknowledge this. This creates a fundamental tension – while Iran could pragmatically accept proxy reductions, it views missile capabilities as essential to its defence doctrine, making comprehensive agreement unlikely without significant concessions.
A third critical difference lies in the sanctions relief structure. While the JCPOA provided Iran with swift economic gains—such as the suspension of U.S. secondary sanctions, UNSC backing (Resolution 2231), a surge in oil exports, and access to $100 billion in frozen assets—a Trump-era deal would likely adopt a slower, more conditional approach. Relief would be tied to verified milestones, with key sanctions and assets withheld until full compliance, aligning with EU efforts to trigger snapback before Russia assumes the UNSC presidency in October 2025, ensuring enforcement mechanisms are locked in before Moscow can shield Tehran.
This tougher approach reflects lessons from the JCPOA’s front-loaded benefits, testing whether Iran’s revolutionary establishment can endure prolonged economic pressure without the rapid financial resuscitation it enjoyed in 2016–2018, even as its proxy networks and missile programs face simultaneous constraints.
The final distinction concerns verification mechanisms and stakeholder dynamics: whereas the JCPOA was fundamentally a coalitional agreement with process-oriented safeguards – featuring delayed IAEA inspections at military sites that perpetuated reported concerns about hidden facilities and nuclear materials – a Trump-negotiated deal would likely demand far more intrusive, anytime-anywhere access while establishing automatic snapback provisions for non-compliance, effectively replacing the P5+1’s multilateral framework with a U.S.-centric enforcement model.
This unilateralism reflects Trump’s signature diplomatic approach, wherein Washington would dominate the process despite inevitable (though significantly diminished) participation by the EU, China, and Russia due to their UNSC roles – a stark contrast to 2015’s collective structure, and one that risks alienating precisely those partners needed to sustain long-term pressure on Tehran when violations inevitably emerge.
What’s at stake for the Middle East?
Should Trump successfully negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran, the regional geopolitical landscape could undergo significant transformations. In a scenario where both parties reach a compromise – for instance, Iran completely abandoning its nuclear program while retaining ballistic missiles and securing sanctions relief – America’s traditional role as a regional balancer would shift decisively in Tehran’s favour at the expense of Gulf states.
This realignment might push Saudi Arabia and the UAE to abandon their civilian nuclear aspirations and instead focus on conventional deterrence architectures, ensuring they remain lucrative clients for the U.S. military-industrial complex. Notably, several Gulf nations now appear willing to facilitate such an agreement, marking a stark contrast to their vehement opposition during Obama’s 2015 deal, suggesting a Trump-negotiated agreement might better address their security concerns.
This development could advance the tentative Saudi-Iran normalisation process beyond its current nominal stage, fostering more integrated Iran-Gulf relations. Israel, meanwhile, would likely lobby Washington to maintain maximalist demands – pushing for stringent limitations on Iran’s capabilities and favouring Trump’s hard-liner negotiation tactics. Should Iran demonstrate transparent compliance, its economic recovery through sanctions relief would serve as the ultimate reward and integrate it into the region.
Conversely, failure to reach an agreement could escalate toward military confrontation, with the U.S. doubling down on maximum pressure tactics. The recent U.S. operations against Houthis in the Red Sea served as a pointed message – with Iran as the ultimate intended recipient. A direct military clash would plunge the region into profound uncertainty and chaos, as signalled by America’s strategic positioning of B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, a clear show of force.
Iran enters this confrontation from a weakened position compared to its pre-Syrian civil war influence peak. With both regional dynamics and domestic conditions deteriorating, prolonged conflict risks catastrophic losses that Tehran can ill afford – making military escalation appear rationally unacceptable. The calculus suggests that Iran’s leadership, despite their rhetoric, ultimately judges open conflict as a risk beyond prudent acceptance, particularly when facing a coordinated U.S.-Gulf-Israeli pressure front capable of systematically dismantling their strategic assets.